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COURT ORDERED ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
Confessions constitute a sensitive and hard
problem for law enforcement agencies and for the
courts. Without a confession in evidence juries will
be forced to determine guilt on a factual recon-
struction of the act and not on the basis of what
an accused said. Confessions would still be useful
in the process of gathering the basic fact founda-
tion but would have less an impact on the trial.
If the judge decides before trial to exclude the
confession then the efficiencies of the joint trial
can be retained. Another way to look at this
factor would be to consider how seriously would it
prejudice the prosecutor's case to exclude the
confession from evidence. This would highlight the
basic decision being made: balancing the interests
of fairness for the codefendant against the state's
interest in using a confession in a joint trial.
The three aforementioned factors which were
relied upon in Delli Paoli are still relevant and
effective indicia of possible prejudice to the
codefendant if used the way here suggested. The
two other Delli Paoli factors-that the separate
interest of the defendant is repeatedly emphasized
throughout trial, and that the record does not
show confusion on the part of the jury-have
little, if any, remaining weight. Bruton held that
limiting instructions emphasizing the separate
interests of the defendants are not enough to
protect their rights. Indications of jury confusion
no longer would be relevant in the suggested
pretrial procedure. Even during the trial the
confusion and the source of the confusion would
be hard to determine and would not be a good basis
upon which to measure the extent of fairness in a
joint trial.
This pretrial procedure would not be an added
burden on the court's time when weighed against
the time that would otherwise be taken up in
numerous retrials of misjoined cases. If the de-
fendant never makes a motion to sever until the
trial starts, the burden would rest on him to
show that the trial judge clearly abused his dis-
cretion under a rule such as Federal Rule 14
permitting the joint trial.
It is hard to foresee whether this plan would be
viable and useful in all situations, but an attempt
should be made to preserve the advantages of the
joint trial. Law enforcemen: agencies are going
to be forced to depend less on confessions and it
would be over-ambitious and wasteful for the
prosecutor to demand the inclusion of an un-
necessary confession at the cost of the benefits of
the joint trial. Bruton reflects the Court's con-
tinulng sensitivity towards the problems involved
in securing and using confessions but it also
develops an approach which will reduce the
opportunity for both the state and the defendant
to benefit through. the use of the joint trial.
FEDERAL PROCEDURE FOR COURT ORDERED ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE: DOES IT MEET THE STANDARDS OF
BERGER AND KATZ?
STEPHEN LINZER
Recent criminal law decisions of the United
States Supreme Court have displayed a growing
concern for the individual in society and for his
right to be free from governmental intrusions upon
his privacy.1 At the same time, there has been an
awareness on the part of individual members of the
Court that crime, specifically organized crime, is
growing rapidly and can only be controlled and
limited by effective law enforcement procedures.
2
1 The legal concept of a right to privacy was dis-
cussed by Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,
4 H~Av. L. REv. 193, 198 (1890). See, e.g., Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
2 See, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 113-14
(1967), White, J., dissenting.
These two considerations-the right to privacy and
the need to stop the growth of crime-are at con-
flict in the current controversy over the use of
electronic surveillance' to aid in the investigation
of serious crime.
Because of the nature of their operations and
the need for secrecy, criminal groups utilize a
minimum of written communications. However,
the diversity of their enterprises, the large number
3As used, electronic surveillance includes eaves-
dropping, wiretapping, and all techniques or devices
by which a person is able to hear or record the com-
munications of others. For a history of electronic




of accomplices or employees, and the great dis-
tances between segments of the organization, make
the telephone the main means of communication.
As a result, electronic surveillance techniques,
which include mechanical or electrical eaves-
dropping and wiretapping, may provide the evi-
dence to convict members of organized criminal
groups.
4
The President, Congress, and the Supreme
Court have recently taken positions on the subject
of electronic surveillance in an attempt to create a
consistent federal position on the law enforcement
techniques to be employed in effectively controlling
organized crime. The objective of this comment is
to examine the recent activity of Congress and the
Supreme Court with regard to electronic surveil-
lance.
Since past Supreme Court decisions failed to
provide an adequate standard to which law en-
forcement officials could conform, electronic
surveillance techniques were used with uncer-
tainty.' In Olmstead v. United States,6 the first
case to consider the status of wiretapping, the
Supreme Court held that the tapping of telephone
wires leading from the residences of the defendants
was not a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. In finding that the evidence obtained
was admissible, the Court stated that the Constitu-
tion did not forbid such activities unless there had
been an actual unlawful entry. In addition, the
Court held that the Fourth Amendment applied
only to "material" objects; therefore, a conversa-
tion passing over a telephone wire could not be
seized within the meaning of that amendment.
4 PRESWENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMNT
AND ADMINISTRATION or JusTICE, THE CHiLLENGE OF
CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 201 (1967). See also WESTIN,
PRIvAcY AND FREEDOM 77 (1967):
Even though any reader of newspapers knows that
wiretapping goes on in the United States, it is still
almost impossible to conduct a business, engage in
politics, participate in civic groups, or even run the
Mafia without resorting to the telephone.
For a discussion of the extent to which members of
organized criminal groups who attended the Ap-
palachian meeting in 1957 correlated their activities by
telephone, see SELECT COMMITTEE ON IMPROPER
AcTviTrIES IN THE LABOR OR MANAGEMENT FIELD, S.
REP. No. 1139, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, 488 (1960).
For a detailed description of the current devices and
techniques, see WESTN, supra at 73-78; DASH, supra
note 3, at 305-79.
5See Westin, The Wire-Tapping Problem: An
Analysis and a Legislative Proposal, 52 CoLum. L. Rzv.
165 (1952), and Note, Eavesdropping, Wiretapping, and
the Law of Search and Seizure: Some Implications of the
Katz Decision, 9 ARiz. L. REv. 428 (1968).
6 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
At the time the Olmstead case was decided there
was no federal law specifically aimed at wiretapping.
In 1934, however, when the Federal Communica-
tions Act was passed by Congress, section 605
provided that:
no person not being authorized by the sender
shall intercept any communication and di-
vulge or publish the existence, contents, sub-
stance, purport, effect or meaning of such
intercepted communication to any person...7
Several years after the enactment of the Federal
Communications Act, the Supreme Court, in
Nardone v. United States, 8 interpreted section 605
to prohibit interception and divulgence of telephone
conversations, and any evidence obtained thereby
was inadmissible in federal courts. The decision
was not founded on constitutional grounds, but
rather on the Court's supervisory powers over
federal courts and officers. In the second Nardone
case,9 the Supreme Court went further and held
that section 605 barred not only evidence obtained
directly by wiretapping but also evidence obtained
by use of leads secured by wiretapping. Other in-
terpretations of section 605 extended its coverage
to interception and divulgence of intrastate as well
as interstate calls,"0 to state law enforcement offi-
cers," and, more recently, to suppression in state
courts.12
In the area of electronic or mechanical eavesdrop-
ping ("bugging"), as distinguished from wiretap-
ping, the Supreme Court established the doctrine
that evidence procured by electronic eaves-
dropping devices became inadmissible only when
there had been an unauthorized physical invasion
of the defendant's premises. In Goldman v. United
States 3 the Court found that the use of a detecta-
phone placed against the partition wall of the de-
fendant's office in order to overhear conversations
did not violate the Fourth Amendment since there
was no physical intrusion into the office. The
7 48 STAT. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1964). This
general language was taken from the Radio Act of
1927 and was not intended to deal with the problems
of telephone tapping. See the testimony of Professor
Alan Westin at the Hearings Before the Subcomittee
of Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., pt.2 at 195, May
28, 1958.
8 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
'308 U.S. 338 (1939).
10 Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
1 Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
"Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378 (1968).
"3 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
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holding that a finding of no "trespass" foreclosed
Fourth Amendment considerations was re-affirmed
in Ot Lee v. United States" when the Court decided
that an informer could be wired for sound to
transmit a suspect's statements to officers waiting
with a receiver outside the building.
In 1961, in Silverman v. United States,15 the
Court for the first time specifically held that eaves-
dropping accomplished by an unlawful invasion of
a constitutionally protected area violated the
Fourth Amendment. A "spike mike" was inserted
into a heating duct to pick up conversations in
other parts of the building. While emphasizing
that the eavesdropping was accomplished by
means of an unauthorized physical penetration
into the premises, the Court also found that the
scope of the Fourth Amendment reached "in-
tangible" objects and that the interception of con-
versations could constitute a search and seizure.
Soon after, however, the Court showed indica-
tions that an actual physical penetration into a
constitutionally protected area might not be de-
terminative in the area of eavesdropping. In Lopez
v. United Statesi6 the Court held that there was no
Fourth Amendment violation when an internal
revenue agent, invited into the defendant's office,
recorded a bribe offer on a small tape recorder
concealed on his person. In the decision, the Court
did not rely solely on the absence of a trespass as
it had in Ot Lee, which involved a similiar fact
situation; rather, it found that there bad been no
eavesdropping in the proper sense of the term as
the agent could have heard the conversation with-
out the aid of the listening device. The Court
further emphasized that the defendant had as-
sumed the risk that his conversation would be re-
produced in court with or without the aid of the
electronic device.
This was the state of the law when, recently, the
controversy surrounding electronic surveillance
was cast in a new perspective. In two cases,
Berger v. New York17 and Katz v. United States,"8 the
Supreme Court departed from previous treatments
and rewrote the law relating to electronic surveil-
lance. Berger,9 which tested the validity of New
York's eavesdrop statute,2 concluded that the
14 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
15 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
16 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
"388 U.S. 41 (1967).
18 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
19 For our purposes the facts are not important.
They may be found at 388 U.S. 44-45.
20 N.Y. CODE CRI. PRoc. § 813-a (1957). A new
eavesdropping statute written to conform to the
statute was so broad that it allowed a trespassory
intrusion into the constitutionally protected area
of privacy and thus was violative of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments3.
While stating that New York's statute, which
required a court order, satisfied the Fourth Amend-
ment's command that a neutral and detached
authority be interposed between the police and
the publicn the Court found the statute deficient
on its face in several respects. The statute failed to
meet the Fourth Amendment standard that a
warrant must describe with particularity "the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." 2 It lacked a provision for a detailed de-
scription of the type of conversation sought, which
is necessary for court ordered wiretapping in order
to indicate the government's specific objectives
and limit the officer executing the warrant.
24
Further, the Court stated that the order should
authorize one limited intrusion rather than a
series or continuous surveillance; 25 a new order
must be issued when an officer seeks to resume a
search. 2 Also, the officer must execute the order
Berger decision has since been enacted into law in
New York. See 3 CR4m. L. REP. 2249; N.Y. CODE
Cznr. PRoc. §§ 814--25(Supp. 1968).
21388 U.S. 41, at 44. In a case currently before the
Court, Kaiser v. New York, 4: Cr. L. 4152-53, this
same New York statute is involved. With regard to the
retroactive effect of Katz and Berger, the Court is
being asked to decide if the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments bar admission at a state criminal trial of
evidence gathered in accordance with a wiretap order
issued under a statute subsequently declared un-
constitutional.
22 388 U.S. at 54, citing Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
"The Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause
supported by Oath or Affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
The Court quoted with approval the language in
Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323,330 (1966), that
allowed the admission into evidence of a recording
obtained by eavesdropping because the authorization
of the judges was "based upon a detailed factual
affidavit alleging the commission of a specific criminal
offense directly and immediately affecting the ad-
ministration of justice.., for the narrow and par-
ticularized purpose of ascertaining the truth of the
affidavit's allegations." 388 U.S. at 57.
24 388 U.S. at 57.251 Id. The Court also stated that the authorization
for two months of eavesdropping is the equivalent of
a series of intrusions, searches, and seizures pursuant
to a single showing of probable cause. Id. at 59.
26 Id. at 57, 59. The Court said that an extension
must be based on a new and present determination of
probable cause.
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with dispatch7 and make a return on it, indicating
the manner of execution and the materials seized.n
Finally, there must be a showing of exigent cir-
cumstances in order to avoid the requirement of
notice to the subject of the search. 29 As a result of
these unalterable standards, Mr. Justice Black,
dissenting, stated that "it seems obvious... that
the Court's holding by creating obstacles that
cannot be overcome, makes it completely impossi-
ble for the State or Federal Government ever to
have a valid eavesdropping statute." 0
Justice Black's fears were partially abated by the
Court's subsequent decision in Katz v. United
States" which implied that a narrowly drawn
electronic surveillance statute could be con-
stitutional if the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment were met.32 In Katz, the defendant was
convicted for transmitting wagering information
by telephone across state lines in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1084. The defendant's end of the conver-
sation was overhead by F.B.I. agents who had
attached an electronic listening and recording
device to the outside of the public telephone booth.
Evidence of his conversation was introduced at
trial. The Supreme Court, in reversing the de-
cision of the Court of Appeals,3 3 specifically
rejected the test of a "constitutionally protected
area" which it had employed in the past34 and
stated that "the Fourth Amendment protects
27Id. at 57, 59-60. With regard to execution, the
Court found the New York statute defective in not
providing for termination of the eavesdrop once the
conversation sought was seized.
3 Id. at 57.
21 Id. at 60.
30 Id. at 71.
31389 U.S. 347 (1967).
3 This position is not shared by several writers who
have reviewed the Katz decision. See, e.g., Schwartz,
Electronic Eatesdropping-What the Supreme Court
Did Not Do, 4 Can. L. BuILL. 83, 89 (1968).
"The Supreme Court often moves in mysterious ways.
Because policy-making on a case by case basis
restricts the Court to the particular facts of the case
before it, its decisions are often merely suggestive
rather than definitive, settling only the obviously
immediate, while unsettling the obviously im-
minent .... The only legal effect of the two decisions
is to do what the Court has done many times before:
to piece out on a case by case basis, the implications
of certain basic principles. In the area of electronic
eavesdropping, that principal remains after Katz
what it was before and after Berger: the Fourth
Amendment permits only a narrowly circumscribed
search and seizure of specific items."
369 F.2d 130 (9th Cir. 1966).
34 See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510,
512 (1961), Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438-
39 (1963), Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 57 (1967).
people, not places." 1 It then redefined the
applicable Fourth Amendment standard:
What a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But
what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be con-
stitutionally protected.3 6
Therefore, the Court concluded, the government's
surveillance violated the privacy upon which the
defendant had relied while using the telephone
booth and thus constituted a "search and seizure"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.n
As a result, the activities of the government had to
be considered within Fourth Amendment stand-
ards. The Court reemphasized the Berger guidelines
and presented a coherent package of requirements
for the admissiblity of evidence resulting from
electronic surveilance.-s
In reaffirming the requirement for judicial au-
thorization, the Court stated that a constitutional
authorization for electronic surveillance could be
obtained:"7
It is clear that this surveillance was so nar-
rowly circumscribed that a duly authorized
magistrate, properly notified of the need for
such investigation, specifically informed of
the basis on which it was to proceed, and
dearly apprised of the precise intrusion it
would entail, could constitutionally have
authorized, with appropriate safeguards, the
very limited search and seizure the Govern-
ment asserts in fact took place.
40
35 389 U.S. at 351. Preceding this statement, the
Court had said that the Fourth Amendment could not
be translated into a general constitutional right to pri-
vacy. That Amendment protects individual privacy
against certain types of governmental intrusion, but its
protections go further and often have nothing to do
with privacy at all. Id. at 350.
36 389 U.S. at 351-52.
1
7 Id. at 353.
'7Evidence illegally obtained can not be used in
federal court, Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886), or in state court, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
655 (1961).
19 Compare supra note 32.
40 389 U.S. at 354. This portion of the decision has
resulted in much controversy. Advocates of electronic
surveillance point to it as an expression of approval for
a narrowly circumscribed, court ordered search. How-
ever, critics of electronic surveillance cite this sentence
as a limiting factor--suggesting that a search so limited
as in Katz was the only acceptable kind:
"Katz thus permits eavesdropping in one of the rare
situations where it can be limited-a bug on one side
[Vol 60
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However, since the government agents in Katz
failed to secure a court order and failed to make a
return on their interceptions, the Court would not
sustain their actions.4 In the important qualifica-
tion of the need for notice--an element which had
previously been considered a necessity in the issu-
ance of search warrants--the Court recognized
that while a conventional warrant ordinarily
notifies the suspect of the search, this requirement
may be omitted in an authorized electronic sur-
veillance when the announcement would allow the
escape of the suspect or the destruction of critical
evidence.43 Since electronic surveillance is success-
ful only when the suspect is deprived of notice, this
qualification was necessary.
Even though the Berger and Katz decisions pro-
vided a constitutional outline of the safeguards
necessary to conduct a legitimate Fourth Amend-
ment search and seizure, they did not enunciate a
uniform procedure for federal agencies to follow in
eavesdropping and wiretapping. The push for ef-
fective' legislation= " in this area culminated in
June, 1968, when Congress, after much delibera-
tion and discussion, passed the "Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe-Streets Act of 1968" containing
eleven principal sections (Titles).
4' Title III,4
of conversations which take place in a sporadically
used place that cannot be easily used by more than
one person, and where the bug is limited to the oc-
casions that the suspect actually uses the bugged
premises."
Schwartz, supra note 32, at 83.
41389 U.S. at 356-57.
"See Donnelly, Electronic Eavesdropping, 38 Nom
DA=s LAW. 667, 679 (1963).
43 389 U.S. at 355 citing Ker v. California, 374 U.S.
23, 37-41 (1964).
44 Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Berger,
June 12, 1967, the Federal Wire Interception Act (S.
675) had been introduced by Senator McClellan on
January 25, 1967. On February 8, 1967, President
Johnson had sent to Congress his Right of Privacy Act
(S. 928) which outlawed electronic surveillance except
in national security cases. After Berger was decided,
Senator Hruska introduced the Electronic Surveil-
lance Control Act of 1967 (S. 2050).
45 Pub. L. No. 90-351, 90th Cong., 82 Stat. 197 (June,
1968). The eleven titles are:
Title I-Law Enforcement Assistance
Title 11-Admissibility of Confessions, Reviewa-
bility of Admission in Evidence of Confessions in
State Cases, Admissibility in Evidence of Eye
Witness Testimony, and Procedure in Obtaining
-Writs of Habeas Corpus
Title rn-Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance
Title IV-State Firearms Control Assistance
Title V-Disqualification For Engaging in Riots and
Civil Disorders
Title VI-Confirmation of the Director of the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation.
Title VII-Unlawful Possession or Receipt of Fire-
arms
the focus of this discussion, represents a permissive
scheme of court ordered electronic surveillance
while complying with the Supreme Court decisions
in Berger and Katz. It has two fundamental pur-
poses: protecting the privacy of wire and oral
communications and delineating on a uniform basis
the circumstances and conditions under which the
interception of wire47 and oral18 communications
may be authorized.
49
To assure the privacy of oral and wire communi-
cations, Title III expressly prohibits all wiretapping
and other forms of electronic surveillance by per-
sons other than duly authorized law enforcement
officials engaged in the investigation or prevention
of specified types of crimes,50 and allows law en-
forcement surveillance only after authorization of
a court order obtained upon a showing and find-
ing of probable cause.5' This prohibition is sub-
ject to four exceptions." Title III also bans the
Title VIII-Providing For An Appeal By the United
States From Decisions Sustaining Motions To Sup-
press Evidence
Title IX-Additional Grounds For Issuing Warrant
Title X-Prohibiting Extortion and Threats In the
District of Columbia
Title XI-General Provisions.
46 Title 11I is essentially a combination of S. 675 and
S. 2050 mentioned supra note 44.
47 Wire communication means any communication
made in whole or in part through the use of facilities
for the transmission of communications by the aid of
wire, cable, or other like connection between the point
of origin and the point of reception furnished or oper-
ated by any person engaged as a common carrier pro-
viding or operating such facilities for the transmission
of interstate or foreign communications. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510 (1).
48 Oral communications means any oral communica-
tions uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation
that such communication is not subject to interception
under circumstances justifying such expectation. 18
U.S.C. § 2510 (2).
49S . REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
60 18 U.S.C. § 2511
5118 U.S.C. § 2518
The President may obtain information by such
means as he may deem necessary to protect the nation
from attack or hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain
intelligence information essential to the nation's
security, and to protect the internal security of the
United States from those who advocate its overthrow
by force or other unlawful means. 18 U.S.C. § 2511
(3). Employees of the Federal Communications Com-
mission may, in the normal course of employment,
intercept and disclose wire communications in the
discharge of the monitoring responsibilities discharged
by the Commission in the enforcement of Chapter 5
of Title 47 of the United States Code. 18 U.S.C.§ 2511
(2) (b). Communication common carriers may intercept
and disclose wire communications in the normal course
of their employment while engaged in any activity
necessary to the rendition of service, or protection of
the rights or property of the carrier of such communica-
tion. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2)(a). Persons acting under
19691
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manufacture, distribution, sale, possession, and
advertising of wiretapping and eavesdropping de-
vices.1
3
Significantly, the legislative program for elec-
tronic surveillance has amended section 605 of
the Federal Communications Act of 1934.
54 The
amendment provides an exemption from the tradi-
tional prohibitions for persons authorized or per-
mitted by Title III to tap and thus removes the
serious statutory obstacle of section 605.
55 Yet, it
still leaves for consideration the question of how
the Congressional drafters have conformed to the
Supreme Court decisions as they relate to a pro-
cedure for authorizing the interception of wire or
oral communications.5 6 An examination of the
relevant provisions demonstrates the attempt
which was made to insure constitutionality.
Section 2518 of Title III establishes strict legis-
lative requirements which must be followed by law
enforcement agencies in applying for court authori-
zation to intercept wire and oral communications.
These provisions reflect both Congress' interpreta-
tion of the recent Supreme Court decisions on
electronic surveillance and safeguards which Con-
gress felt were necessary to provide for valid and
effective law enforcement.
An application must be made in writing upon
oath or affirmation to a "judge of competent
jurisdiction" 51 stating the applicant's authority to
color of law may intercept wire or oral communications
where such a person(s) is a party to the conversation
or has been given prior consent to such interception.
18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2)(c). See Lopez v. United States,
373 U.S. 4-27 (1963), Rathbun v. United States, 355
U.S. 107(1957), On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747
(1952), Greenawalt, The Consent Problem in Wire-
tapping and Eavesdropping, 68 CoLum. L. Rxv. 189
(1968).
'z 18 U.S.C. § 2512 (1)(a), (b), (c). Exempted are
the actions of a communications common carrier and
its employees or persons under contract with a com-
munications common carrier in the normal course of
its business, and any law enforcement officer of the
United States, a State, or a political subdivision of a
state in the normal course of its activities. 18 U.S.C. §
2512 (2)(a), (b).
64 See supra note 7.
55 47 U.S.C. § 605 as amended by § 803 of the Act.
56 Focus will be on section 2518 of Chapter 119,
Title 18 of the United States Code which outlines the
procedure for the interception of wire or oral com-
munications. Well written and very similar statutory
schemes along with explanatory notes may be found
in Blakey and Hancock, A Proposed Electronic Surveil-
lance Control Act, 43 NOTRE DAus LAW. 657 (1968),
A.B.A. PROJECT ON MINDUms STAmDAS FOR CRI-
INAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE (Tentative Draft, 1968).
57 With regard to federal practice, a "judge of com-
petent jurisdiction" means a judge of a United States
District Court or a United States Court of Appeals.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (9)(a).
make such an application. The need for antecedent
justification before a magistrate is central to the
Fourth Amendment and serves as a precondition
to lawful electronic surveillance
2 The Fourth
Amendment requires only that warrants "be sup-
ported by oath or affirmation." -9 Even though it
makes no mention of the necessity for writing, it
has become a statutory requirement in present
federal warrant practice.60
Congress has interpreted the Berger and Katz
decisions to require that specific information be
contained in each application. This information is
an affirmative test of the propriety of the investi-
gation in light of traditional Fourth Amendment
principles of search and seizure. Every application
must include the identity of both the investigative
or law enforcement officer making the application
and the officer authorizing the application.
6' This
assessment of responsibility is advantageous since
it centralizes in a publicly responsible official the
formulation of law enforcement policy on the use of
electronic surveillance which will avoid the develop-
ment of divergent practices. If abuses do result, the
lines of responsibility may be traced to an identifi-
able person. 62
In addition, the application is required to include
a complete statement of the facts and circum-
stances upon which the applicant justifies his
belief that the judge should issue the ex parte order.
58 See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 54 (1967),
Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 330 (1966),
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 513 (Douglas,
J. concurring) (1961). This requirement stems from
the necessity of protecting the individual from impulsive
police action:
In their understandable zeal to ferret out crime and
in the excitement of the capture of a suspected
person, officers are less likely to possess the detach-
ment and neutrality with which the constitutional
rights of the suspect must be viewed. To provide the
necessary security against unreasonable intrusions
upon the private lives of individuals, the framers of
the Fourth Amendment required adherence to
judicial processes wherever possible.
Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948),
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56
(1948), United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464
(1932).
59 Supra note 13. See Dow v. Baird, 389 F.2d. 882,
883(10th Cir. 1968): "There can be no doubt whatever
that the search... was illegal... because it was not
'supported by oath or affirmation' as required by the
Fourth Amendment .... "
60 Sparks v. United States, 90 F.2d. 61 (6th Cir.
1937). FED. R. Cans. PRoc. 41.
61 Only the Attorney General, or any Assistant
Attorney General designated by the Attorney General,
may authorize an application for the interception of
wire or oral communications. 18 U.S.C. § 2516.
62 With regard to fixing responsibility see King v.
United States, 282 F.2d. 398 (4th Cir. 1960).
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This statement must include four elements to be
valid: (1) details as to the particular offense that
has been, is being, or is about to be committed; 3
(2) a particular description of the place where, or
the facilities from which, the communication is to
be intercepted; (3) the identity of the persons, if
known, committing the offense and whose com-
munication is to be intercepted; and (4) a par-
ticular description of the type of communications
sought to be intercepted u This information is
meant to provide the basis for a determination of
probable cause by the examining judge.65
Prior to Berger and Katz it had been suggested
that an inherent problem in obtaining a valid court
order for electronic surveillance was the inability
to meet Fourth Amendment requirements of
particularity.66 However, the application procedure
outlined by Congress is basically a compilation of
those requirements which the Court had consid-
ered and discussed in Berger and Katz.6
The applicant is also required to make a state-
ment concerning the circumstances that necessitate
resort to electronic surveillance. Appropriate con-
siderations are whether other investigative pro-
cedures have been tried, whether they are unlikely
to succeed if tried, and whether the alternatives
may be too dangerous. By making this statement,
the officer is meeting another firm requirement that
the Court has enunciated. The purpose of this in-
formation is to establish that there exist the "exi-
gent circumstances" 1 required in Berger19 and
63 Offenses for which an order may be obtained are
set out in § 2516 (1). In Berger, the Court had said
that a specific offense must be alleged. See supra note 23.64In Berger, 388 U.S. at 57, the Court had said:
"Among other safeguards, the order described the
type of conversation sought with particularity, thus
indicating the specific objective of the Govern-
ment ...."
65 Findings which are required by 18 U.S.C. § 2518
(3)(a), (b), (d).
66"It is doubtful... that a court order authorizing
electronic eavesdropping can comply with the 'war-
rant clause'... .The provision of the warrant clause
which seems to defy compliance is the requirement
that a search warrant must particularly describe
the 'things to be seized.' A specific description of
the conversation to be 'seized' in the future is im-
possible since the words have not yet come into
existence.... Due to the nature of electronic eaves-
dropping, it seems apparent that a court order can
not meet the particularization requirement of the
warrant clause... ." Comment, The Constitutional-
ity of Electronic Eavesdropping, 18 S.C.L. REV.
835, 837 (1966).
67 Supra notes 21-43.
6s Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority in
Katz, stated that the magistrate should be properly
notified of the "need" for such an investigation. 389
U.S. at 354. It would appear, therefore, that electronic
surveillance should be a selective investigative tech-
Katz79 to justify a search without notice. Tradi-
tionally, a subject is given notice by the warrant
which announces both authority for the search and
its purpose7
The application must also state the period of time
for which the interception is required to be main-
tained. This requirement must be read in light of
later provisions which establish a thirty day maxi-
mum time period 2 and allow for court supervision
during the time of interception." If the nature of
the investigation is such that the interception
should not be terminated when the described type
74
of communication has been first obtained, the ap-
plicant must provide a particular description of
facts establishing probable cause that additional
circumstances of the same type will occurY5
Possible misuse of this process is guarded against
by a provision that requires the application for the
eavesdropping order to contain facts concerning all
previous applications involving any of the same
persons, facilities, or places specified in the appli-
cation, and the action taken by earlier courts. Con-
tinuous observation resulting from repeated appli-
cations should be prevented by this safeguard. It
will also enable the examining judge to question re-
peated applications and ascertain the need for
interceptions if they have been fruitless in the past.
Furthermore, the judge may require the applicant
to furnish additional testimony or documentary
evidence in support of the applicationY6
Since Congress appears to have codified effec-
tively the requirements set out by the Supreme
Court in Berger and Katz, constitutional objections
to the application process should have little merit
unless the procedure is abused. The restrictive
standards which must be met by the applicant
should effectively insure that there will not be in-
discriminate use of electronic surveillance, while
allowing valid interceptions if the appropriate pro-
cedure is followed.
nique, used only in cases of "need"-not as a standard
investigative procedure.
69 388 U.S. at 60.
70 389 U.S. at 355-56 n. 16.
71 The exception is based upon Ker v. California,
374 U.S. 23, 37-41 (1963), a decision in which the
Court found that prior notice would have resulted in
the destruction of evidence subject to seizure. As a
result, the Court held, as to this question, that notice
was legitimately withheld.
r 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (5).
- 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (6).
74 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1)(b) (ii), supra note 64.
76 Substantively this provision is very important
and will be discussed in the examination of the time
standards.
76 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2).
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Section 2518 of Title III grants the judge au-
thority to enter an ex parte order for the intercep-
tion of either wire or oral communications. The
judge may deny the application or modify it if he
wishes. Before the judge may approve the order,
however, Congress has established required find-
ings which he must make. Based on the information
provided by the applicant and any in camera
examination the judge may have held, the judge
must initially find that there is probable cause77 for
belief that an individual is committing, has com-
mitted, or is about to commit a particular crime
listed in Section 2516Y8 In addition, the judge must
determine whether there is probable cause to be-
lieve that particular communications concerning
the offense will be obtained through the intercep-
tion. He must also find probable cause to believe
that the facilities, or place, from which the wire or
oral communications are to be intercepted are
being used, or about to be used in connection with
the commission of the listed offense. These findings
of probable cause link the individual, the offense,
and a particular place. This avoids the issuance of
"blanket authority to conduct general searches" 
79
-a practice which the Constitution specifically
rejects in the Fourth Amendment.
To avoid the traditional need for notice to the
subject of the search, the judge must also make a
determination that "special facts" or "exigent cir-
cumstances" exist to obviate the requirement.
Again this must be based on the information sup-
plied in the application and additional evidence
that the judge, in his discretion, may receive.80
If the judge makes the required determinations
and decides to grant the order, Congress has set
out the form and inclusions for the order. The
statutory provision is quite explicit as to the con-
tents of the order:
(a) the identity of the person, if known, whose
communications are to be intercepted;
(b) the nature and location of the communica-
77 Probable cause under the Fourth Amendment
exists where the facts and circumstances within the
affiant's knowledge, and of which he has reasonably
trustworthy information, are sufficient unto themselves
to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that
an offense has been or is being committed. Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 .(1925), Husty v.
United States, 282 U.S. 694, 700-01 (1931), Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949).
78 See supra note 63. This list is criticized by Senator
Hart in his separate views in SEN. REP. No. 1097,
supra note 49. Compare A.B.A. PRoJEcT FOR Mumr
STAD ARrms, supra note 56, at 141-42.
1' 388 U.S. at 58, 389 U.S. at 355-56.
80 See supra notes 68, 70.
tions facilities as to which, or the place
where, authority to intercept is granted;
(c) a particular description of the type of com-
munication sought to be intercepted, and a
statement of the particular offense to
which it relates;
(d) the identity of the agency authorized to
intercept the communications, and of the
person authorizing the application; and
(e) the period of time during which such in-
terception is authorized, including a state-
ment as to whether or not the interception
shall automatically terminate when the
described communication has been first ob-
tained.
81
These specifications are designed to insure that the
order is sufficiently definite so that the executing
officer can follow its directions02
The procedure for obtaining an ex parte order for
electronic surveillance is subject to substantive
limitations that reflect an attempt by Congress to
conform to the Supreme Court's guidelines in
Berger and Katz. Unfortunately, the Court has
been unable to promulgate specific functional rules
in the substantive aspects of wiretapping and
eavesdropping. An excellent example of the legal
confusion that results from this situation is the
statutory provision for the time of an electronic
surveillance.
Congress has provided that no order may
authorize or approve the interception of wire or
oral communications for any period of time longer
than is necessary to achieve the objective of the
order, and in no event longer than thirty days.
Extensions may be obtained, but only if another
application is properly filed and the judge makes
the required findings. 83 The extension period must
be no longer than the judge deems necessary to
attain the objectives for which it was granted, and
in no event, longer than thirty days. Congress has
also required that every order and extension must
be executed as soon as possible and conducted in
such a way as to minimize the interception of com-
munications not subject to interception under the
order.
Theseprovisions pose manyproblems from a con-
s8 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (4).
12 See West v. Cabel, 153 U.S. 78 (1894), Steele v.
United States No. 1, 267 U.S. 498 (1925). Nothing
should be left to the discretion of the officer. Marron v.
United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927).83 New orders or extensions must rest upon a present
finding of probable cause. See supra note 36, Sgro v.
United States, 287 U.S. 206 (1932).
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stitutional, as well as a policy, viewpoint. In
Berger, the Supreme Court simply stated that
"authorization of eavesdropping for a two-month
period is the equivalent of a series of intrusions,
searches, and seizures pursuant to a single showing
of probable cause." 84 The only affirmative test,
appearing in Berger and Katz, is that there should
be no greater invasion of privacy than is neces-
sary under the circumstances, Mr. justice Harlan
attempted to clarify this requirement in his
Berger dissent when he stated that the electronic
surveillance "must be confined in time precisely as
the search for tangibles is confined in space".8 By
this standard, it is at least arguable that the Con-
gress has conformed to this limitation by re-
quiring that surveillance terminate when the ob-
jective is reached, or at the end of a period imposed
by the issuing judge. However, if those who read
Katz narrowly are correct in their interpretation,
then the federal officer who uses the entire thirty
day period to intercept communications of a sus-
pect will have conducted a "general search"
through an "indiscriminate dragnet." 11 He will
have picked up all the conversations on the wire
tapped or in the room bugged.
Strength for this view is gathered from the
language of the Supreme Court in Berger. The
Court stated that it had in the past, "under specific
conditions and circumstances, sustained the use of
eavesdropping devices." 11 For this proposition the
Court cited four cases which involved very cir-
cumscribed eavesdropping8 9 In each of these four
cases, as in Katz, the eavesdropping the Supreme
Court approved was carefully circumscribed and
limited to specific conversations which the eaves-
dropper knew would take place. The view of those
who read Katz narrowly is, therefore, that there is
no implied Court approval for a thirty day inter-
ception such as provided for in Title yi-.10
84 388 U.S. at 59.
85 388 U.S. at 57, 389 U.S. at 355.
8 388 U.S. at 100.
87 See 388 U.S. at 65 (Douglas, J. concurring).
8 Id. at 63.
9 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942),
On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952), Osborn v.
United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966), Lopez v. United
States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963). In Goldman an F.B.I.
detectaphone was installed to overhear four conversa-
tions to which an F.B.I. informer was a party. In On
Lee an informer wore a radio transmitter for his con-
versation with a specific suspect. In Lopez and Osborn,
the Supreme Court upheld the use of an eavesdropping
device wired to an informer, and used to record the
informer's conversations with a suspect.
90 See, e.g., views of Senator Hart, SEN. REP. No.
1097, supra note 49.
On the other hand, those arguing for the reason-
ableness of this provision cite the safeguards of the
statute which require that the interception be
terminated if the conversation sought is obtained."
Any departure from this norm would constitute a
violation of both the order and the law, making
such interceptions inadmissible in court. 2 Also,
the purpose of the thirty day period is to establish
a maximum period to prevent the staleness of the
order, and to insure that the officer either ter-
minates his activity at the maximum date or ob-
tains an extension. 3 During this period, the Court
may maintain supervision of the law enforcement
officials' activities through the statutory provis-
ion relating to periodic returns on the order. 4 It
has also been pointed out that, though eavesdrop-
ping by its nature involves the indiscriminate re-
ception of all conversations, a search under a
warrant is equally as indiscriminate in viewing per-
sonal effects and, under the "in plain view" rule,
equally as damaging to the subject.95 Thus, in
theory, it is urged that there is no apparent differ-
ence between the two searches.
The resolution of this issue by the Court will
undoubtedly be influenced by the facts of the case
before it. It is, therefore, essential that restraint
and intelligent monitoring be exercised by law en-
forcement officials for the surveillance to be sus-
tained. An "indiscriminate dragnet" will violate
this permissive section.
Congress has also established a procedure for
periodic judicial supervision during a period of
surveillance. Whenever an order to intercept is
granted, it may require reports to be made to the
issuing judge showing what progress has been
made toward achievement of the authorized ob-
jective and whether there is a continuing need for
interception. 6
This requirement continues the judicial super-
vision in the area of electronic surveillance by pro-
9118 U.S.C. § 2518 (5) conforming to the standard
set out in Katz, 389 U.S. at 354.
92The difficulty in making such a proof in a motion
to suppress is obvious-the law enforcement agents
will be the only ones knowing of the violation. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2515 prohibits the use, as evidence, of intercepted
communications when in violation of this Act.
93 See generally, 100 ALR 2d 525 (1965). For an
alternative time limit suggestion see Westin, supra
note 4, at 391-92.
94 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (6)
95 Comment, Eavesdropping Orders And The Fourth
Amendment, 66 CoLu.m. L. REv. 355, 374 (1966).
96This relates to the requirement that a return be
made on the order, supra note 28, and that the existence
of a "need" be ascertained, supra note 68.
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viding for active judicial participation. 97 When con-
sidered with the standards which the applicant
must meet in providing information to the judge,
this "review" would function as an added safe-
guard. Unfortunately, it is stated as a suggested,
but not mandatory, provisionY. The need for com-
munication between the operator of the intercept
and the issuing judge is seriously undermined by
the failure to make this provision as strict as others
that have been discussed.
In cases of emergency, Congress has created a
procedure for interception of communications that
by-passes the provisions that have been discussed.
When a specially designated investigative or law
enforcement officer determines:
(a) that an emergency situation exists with
respect to conspiratorial activities threatening
the national security interest or to conspira-
torial activities characteristic of organized
crime that requires a communications inter-
ception before an order authorizing such inter-
ception can with due diligence be obtained, and
(b) there are grounds upon which an order
could be entered under this Act, he may inter-
cept such communications if a proper applica-
tion is made within forty eight hours after the
interception has occurred, or begins to occur.99
In such an emergency situation, the interception
shall immediately terminate when the communica-
tion is obtained or when the application for au-
thorization is denied. If the application is denied,
or if the interception is terminated without an
order having been issued, the contents of the inter-
ception shall be treated as having been obtained in
violation of the Act, and an inventory served as
provided for in a later provision.'0 0
The provisions of the emergency section relating
to conspiratorial activities characteristic of or-
ganized crime would appear to be overly permis-
9 "When a magistrate ... acts as a mere rubber
stamp for the police a basic constitutional protection
with roots deep in our national history is reduced to so
many empty words." Dow v. Baird. 389 F.2d. 882,
884 (10th Cir. 1968).
93Whenever an order authorizing interception is
entered pursuant to this chapter, the order may
require reports to be made to the judge who issued
the order showing what progress has been made
toward achievement of the authorized objective
and the need for continued interception. Such
reports shall be made at such intervals as the
judge may require.
18 U.S.C. § 2518 (6).
99 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (7).
1 18 U.S.C. 2518 (8)(d).
sive when read in light of Berger and Katz. Tradi-
tionally, searches conducted without warrants
have been held unlawful even though the facts
showed probable cause.'" The Constitution re-
quires that an impartial judicial officier be inter-
posed between the individual and the police.'0'
As a result, searches conducted outside the judicial
process have been held unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. 103
These general rules governing search and seizure
are subject to a few specifically established excep-
tions, frequently referred to as emergency situa-
tions-the search of a person (and the area under
his control) incidental to a valid arrest, and the
search of a vehicle where there is probable cause to
believe that the vehicle is being used to transport
contraband. TM Recognized as justifying the ab-
sence of a search warrant, these search situations
still require a finding of probable cause.9 5 The pro-
ponents of the emergency section believe that the
statutory situations will fit within the coverage of
the Court's decisions establishing these excep-
tions.109 However, it would appear that the Court
has foreclosed discussion of such a permissive pro-
vision by its language in Katz. The Court stated:'9 '
It is difficult to imagine how any of those ex-
ceptions could ever apply to the sort of search
and seizure involved in this case. Even elec-
tronic surveillance substantially contem-
poraneous with an individual's arrest could
hardly be deemed an "incident" to that ar-
101 Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925)
1
02 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-
82 (1963)
103 See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493,
497-99 (1958); Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253,
261 (1960); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610,
613-15 (1961); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483,
486-87 (1964).
'"
4 See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
153, 156 (1925); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S.
451, 454-56 (1948); Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 174-77 (1949); Cooper v. California, 386
U.S. 58 (1967); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294
298-300 (1967).
101 "In cases where the securing of a warrant is reason-
ably practicable, it must be used.... In cases
where seizure is impossible except without war-
rant, the seizing officer acts unlawfully and at
his peril unless he can show the court probable
cause." Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
156 (1925)
106 "There are exceptional circumstances in which,
on balancing, the need for effective law enforce-
ment against the right of privacy, it may be
contended that a magistrate's warrant for search
may be dispensed with." Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948).
'0 389 U.S. at 357-58.
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rest.l 0 Nor could the use of electronic sur-
veillance without prior authorization be
justified on grounds of 'hot pursuit'. 109
Note should be made of two recent decisions
which recognize an "emergency situation" not
requiring either probable cause or a search warrant:
Patrick v. State"0 and Vauss v. United States."'
Both decisions rest upon a finding that the preser-
vation of human life is paramount to the right of
privacy protected by search and seizure laws and
the accompanying constitutional guarantees. Thus,
whenever the police have credible information that
an unnatural death has, or may have, occurred
they may enter and investigate without an ac-
companying intent either to seize or arrest." 2 A
broad application of this doctrine could justify
emergency electronic surveillance in cases where
the "conspiratorial activities" may have resulted
in an unnatural death, e.g. kidnapping, murder,
and possibly narcotic violations. The statutory
requirement, however, that there exist "grounds
upon which an order could be entered" would still
limit surveillance to situations based upon a find-
ing of probable cause.
With the possible exception of cases involving
unnatural deaths, it would seem that the Court
through its language in Katz has indicated that the
warrantless surveillance would be unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. Though it was not
faced with a Congressional expression of what con-
stituted an emergency situation in Katz, both the
breadth of the statute and the predisposition of
majority of the Court imply rejection of this
section of the Act.
The Court has been less forceful in dealing with
the demands of national security as an exception
10s In Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30
(1925), the Court stated:
"The right without a search warrant contempora-
neously to search persons lawfully arrested while
committing crime and to search the place where the
arrest is made in order to find and seize things con-
nected with the crime as its fruits or as the means
by which it was committed, as well as weapons and
other things to effect an escape from custody, is not
to be doubted."
109 Although '[t]he Fourth Amendment does not
require police officers to delay in the course of an
investigation if to do so would gravely endanger
their lives or the lives of others,' Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99, there seems little
likelihood that electronic surveillance would be a
realistic possibility in a situation so fraught with
urgency. 389 U.S. at 358 n. 21.
110 227 A.2d 486 (Del. 1967).
M 370 F.2d 250 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
"1 227 A. 2d at 489.
to the warrant requirement. In Katz, the Court
mentioned in a footnoteu that it did not reach the
question whether safeguards other than prior
authorization by a magistrate would satisfy the
Fourth Amendment in a situation involving na-
tional security. The issue is raised in two different
contexts in the Safe Streets Act. A prior section"
4
exempts from the Act the constitutional power of
the President to take such measures as he deems
necessary to protect the nation from specified acts
of foreign powers or those presenting a clear and
present danger to the government. But this sec-
tion implicitly recognizes that the actions of the
Executive are limited by the Constitution. There-
fore, the requirements of the Fourth Amendment
should apply to the President's actions, as well as
to the lower level law enforcement officer."'
The provision for an emergency surveillance
upon a finding that conspiratorial activities
threaten the national security is subject to a
similar argument. Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring
in Katz, expressed the view that the Executive
branch would not be disinterested or neutral in
matters of national security. Rather, its proper
function is to investigate and prevent breaches of
national security-the President or the Attorney
General functioning as an adversary in the enforce-
ment process. They would, therefore, be unable to
occupy the neutral position of a judge or magis-
trate. Mr. Justice Douglas further stated that there
should be no distinction under the Fourth Amend-
ment between types of crimes. As a result, na-
tional security cases would involve the same pro-
cedural approach as other crimes." 6
Mr. Justice White, on the other hand, inter-
preted the Court's footnote as an acknowledge-
ment that there are circumstances in which it is
reasonable to search without a warrant. Therefore,
the Court should not require the warrant procedure
and a judge's intervention if the President or the
Attorney General have considered the requirements
of national security and authorized electronic sur-
"1 389 U.S. at 358 n. 23.
114 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (3). See supra, note 52.
"5 In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579 (1952), the Court was asked to decide
whether the President was acthig within his constitu-
tional power when he issued an order directing the
Secretary of Commerce to take possession of most of
the nation's steel mills. The Court held that the aggre-
gate powers of the President, as Chief Executive and
Commander of the Armed Forces, did not permit him
to act in contravention of the Constitution's separation
of powers notion.
116 389 U.S. at 359-60.
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veillance as reasonable." 7 In his dissent in Berger,
Mr. Justice White asked the crucial question:
If electronic surveillance is a 'general search',
or if it must be circumscribed in the manner
the Court now suggests, how can surreptitious
electronic surveillance of a suspected Com-
munist or a suspected saboteur escape the
strictures of the Fourth Amendment?"8
It is suggested that such surveillance can not
escape the dictates of the Constitution unless the
Court is prepared to create classifications of crimes
for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment-a
position apparently without legal precedent." 9
As this comment has sought to emphasize the
need for discriminating and narrowly circumscribed
safeguards in any interception of wire and oral com-
munications, it would appear that an even higher
standard is necessary to conduct an electronic
surveillance without an order in an emergency
situation. There is good reason for this. The
ability to intercept for forty eight hours without
"
7 Id. at 363-64.
118 338 U.S. 116.
"1 In a case currently before the Supreme Court,
Butenko v. United States, 4 Cr.L. 4053, the oral
argument revealed the issues involved in national
security cases. To the Solicitor General's explanation
that the new law [1968 Safe Streets Act] is written in
very general terms and provides that a wiretap, in
national security cases, may issue whenever authorized
by the Attorney General, Mr. Justice Black inquired
"Are you relying on a Congressional rule, and not the
constitution?"
an order is overly permissive, for while any evi-
dence obtained would be in violation of the Act
and therefore excluded, its worth as an investiga-
tive tool for "leads" and corroborative information
might justify misuse of this provision. It is difficult
to envision situations in which such an "emer-
gency" could exist without sufficient time to secure
a court order.
CONCLUSION
The above examination of those parts of Section
2518 which relate to the Supreme Court decisions
in Berger and Katz indicates that the validity of
several provisions will depend on the restraint of
investigative officials. The serious crime problem
in this country demands that instruments neces-
sary for law enforcement be fully employed. Never-
theless, the possible abuses inherent in such sophis-
ticated practices as electronic surveillance require
that specific limitations be imposed. Congress has
sought to provide these standards by closely follow-
ing the requirements set down by the Court in
Berger and Katz. But serious constitutional ques-
tions are raised by those provisions allowing sur-
veillance in emergency situations, issues about
which the Court has given little direction.
Police abuse of the provisions of Section 2518, or
irresponsibility in carrying out its procedural
scheme, could lead the Court to establish more
rigid and severe requirements for eavesdropping, a
development that could spell the end of electronic
surveillance as an effective law enforcement tool.
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SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Exclusionary Rule Held Applicable To Civil
Commitment Procedures For Narcotic Addicts-
People v. Moore, 446 P. 2d 800 (Calif. S.Ct. 1968).
The defendant was arrested for possession of
heroin. He was taken to a jail infirmary and
examined by a doctor. As a result of this examina-
tion, a petition was filed to commit him as a
narcotic addict or as a person who is in imminent
danger of becoming addicted to narcotics. At the
trial he was found to be in imminent danger of
becoming a narcotic addict and committed to a
[Vol. 60
